The thesis examines the motivations behind the US economic and technical aid to Libya, Morocco and Tunisia during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations (i.e. between 1953 and 1963). What issues arose in the context of economic and technical aid in discussions inside the two administrations? What motives are revealed and what were the potential reasons for the reduction or increase of the aid? How much, if any at all, did the US aid policy change with the new president? The primary source material consists of various documents from both administrations.

During the 1950s and 60s, political and strategic interests caused by the Cold War had a huge influence on how economic and technical aid was given to North African countries, which had gained their independence during the 1950s. North Africa was considered to be a strategically important region, and the United States had large military bases in Libya and Morocco. United States was ready to increase its economic support to these countries as long as the governments were sympathetic to retaining US military presence. United States even had an agreement with Libya about giving economic aid in return for the right to operate the large Wheelus Air Base, and when the United States negotiated with Morocco about the fate of its military bases in the country, the Americans brought up the issue of economic assistance. Libya still received considerable amount of American economic aid at the beginning of the 1960s, even though it had started to receive large revenues from oil exports.

One of the main issues tied to US aid to Libya, Morocco and Tunisia during the Eisenhower and Kennedy years was political and economic stability. Because of the strategic importance of the region, it was also important to both administrations that the leaders of all three countries maintained good relations with the United States, and kept their distance to the Soviet Union and Nasser s Egypt. At least Libyan and Tunisian officials tried exploit this and pressured the United States to increase its assistance by talking about offers of aid made by the Soviet Union. In Libya s case the United States was ready to fund many developments projects aimed at warding off Egypt s growing influence in the country.

Besides Cold War enemies, certain European allies caused some headaches to Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations in connection to economic assistance for North African countries. Great Britain had had a significant role in supporting Libya since the end of the Second World War, and France was supposed to promote development in its former colonies Morocco and Tunisia. However, at the end of the 1950s, Great Britain was forced to cut its economic assistance for Libya due to economic problems and France withheld part of its aid to Morocco and Tunisia in order to pressure them to stop supporting Algerian freedom fighters. In both cases the United States had to increase its economic support in order to fill the gaps left by its allies, even though Eisenhower Administration was reluctant to take on a larger role in North Africa. The friction between France and Morocco and Tunisia continued well to the Kennedy era and often frustrated American officials.

It seems clear that during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, achieving economic and social development was often secondary compared to US political and military objectives in North Africa. During the Kennedy era however, actual development objectives gained importance, because of which the aid directed to Tunisia increased dramatically during this period. Unlike Libya or Morocco, Tunisia had a valid development plan, and the Kennedy administration was willing to support it. American officials saw supporting Tunisia as a good model for future development cooperation between Western developed nations and developing countries. At the same time supporting Tunisia was believed to have a positive impact on the external image of the United States in the Third World.